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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

v.

:

JOSEPH P. TUNZI,
Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). The Honorable Judith S. Atherton, Judge, Third District Court,
Salt Lake County, State of Utah entered judgment of conviction for aggravated assault, a
third degree felony, on June 30, 2000. See Judgment contained in Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW.
PRESERVATION
Issue. The state charged Appellant/Defendant Joseph Tunzi ("Joseph" or
"Appellant") with attempted homicide pursuant to the Serious Youth Offender Act, Utah
Code Ann. § 78-3a-602 (1996). A jury acquitted Joseph of attempted homicide but
convicted him of a lesser offense which is not a Serious Youth Offender offense. The
issue in this case is whether the district court lost jurisdiction and was required to remand
the case to the juvenile court when the jury acquitted Joseph of the Serious Youth
Offender charge.

Standard of review. This issue involves a question of statutory construction which
is reviewed for correctness. See State v. Kreuger. 1999 UT App 54, ^flO, 975 P.2d 489
(citation omitted).
Preservation. Joseph moved to transfer this case back to juvenile court after he
was acquitted of attempted homicide and convicted of the lesser charge of aggravated
assault. R. 222:5-11. After his conviction was reversed on appeal, Joseph did not renew
his motion. Although Joseph pleaded guilty following remand, this issue is nevertheless
properly before this Court since it involves a question as to whether the district court had
jurisdiction over Joseph's case. See State v. PeranL 858 P.2d 927, 930 (Utah 1992)
(guilty plea does not waive jurisdictional claims); see discussion infra at 6-8.

TEXT OF RELEVANT STATUTE
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602 (1996), the Serious Youth Offender statute, is
determinative of the issue on appeal. The text of that statute is in Addendum B. The text
of the direct file statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-601 (1996), and the certification statute,
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-603 (1996), is also in Addendum B.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The state filed an Information dated November 5, 1998 in juvenile court, charging
Joseph with attempted criminal homicide, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. §§ 76-5-203 & 76-4-101 (1999). Pursuant to the Serious Youth Offender Act,
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602 (1996), the juvenile court bound Joseph over to district
2

court for trial. R. 12.
Following a jury trial held on April 22-23, 1999, a jury acquitted Joseph of
attempted homicide and convicted him of the lesser charge of aggravated assault which
had been requested by the state. R. 73, 77, 108. Because the elements instruction
included elements for both the third and second degree felony versions of aggravated
assault, the trial judge entered judgment for the third degree felony and sentenced Joseph
to serve zero to five years at the Utah State Prison. R. 117.1 Prior to sentencing, Joseph
moved to transfer the case back to juvenile court because the jury had acquitted him of
the Serious Youth Offender charge, and the third degree felony for which he was
convicted was not a Serious Youth Offender offense over which the district court had
jurisdiction. R. 222:5-10. The trial judge denied that motion. R. 222:11.
In the original appeal, Joseph moved for summary reversal of his conviction when
it was discovered that the videotape and transcript of one day of a two-day trial were
missing. R. 136, 141:194. This Court denied the motion for summary reversal and
1

The instruction for aggravated assault contained alternative elements for both the
third and second degree felony versions of that crime. See Instruction number 12 in
Addendum C. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103, aggravated assault, which
involves intentionally causing serious bodily injury, is a second degree felony whereas
aggravated assault involving the use of a dangerous weapon "or other means offeree
likely to produce death or serious bodily injury" is a third degree felony. Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-5-103 (1999). After the jury acquitted Joseph of the attempted homicide charge and
convicted him of aggravated assault based on alternative elements, Joseph argued and the
state agreed that judgment of conviction must be entered for the third degree felony.
R. 142:2-4. The trial court entered judgment of conviction for aggravated assault, a third
degree felony, but refused to remand the case to the juvenile court. R. 142:12, 117.
3

remanded the case to the trial court for reconstruction of the record. On certiorari, the
Supreme Court reversed that decision and reversed Joseph's conviction and remanded the
case for a new trial. See State v. TunzL 2000 UT 38, 998 P.2d 816 in Addendum D.
On remand, the state attempted to proceed with a second degree felony charge of
either attempted homicide or aggravated assault even though Joseph had been convicted
of only a third degree felony aggravated assault in the original trial. R. 158-75. The state
subsequently offered Joseph, who was in custody at the Utah State Prison or Salt Lake
County Jail throughout the proceedings, a plea bargain whereby Joseph would plead
guilty to the third degree felony and be given credit for time served and released.
R. 223:2-5. Joseph ultimately accepted the plea bargain and pleaded guilty to aggravated
assault, a third degree felony; the trial judge gave Joseph credit for time served and he
was released. R. 223:2, 9-10. Joseph is appealing his conviction for the sole purpose of
attempting to return his case to juvenile court.
On September 7, 2000, this Court issued a sua sponte motion for summary
disposition. After both parties agreed that summary disposition was not appropriate, this
Court set the matter for full briefing.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
A. FACTS REGARDING THE INCIDENT
The facts of the underlying incident are not pertinent to the issue before the Court
on appeal. Basically, the facts regarding the underlying incident are that on Halloween
4

night, 1998, a fight occurred during which Rocky Vigil was stabbed. The factual issue at
trial was whether Joseph or Zeb Smith, Joseph's cousin, stabbed Rocky. None of the
witnesses on the first day of trial testified that Joseph was the person who stabbed Rocky;
some of the witnesses did, however, implicate Zeb as the stabber. R. 141.
Apparently, Zeb Smith, who testified on the second day of trial, was the only
witness whose testimony could arguably be construed as indicating that Joseph was the
stabber. Since a transcript of the second day of trial does not exist, there was no way of
determining in the initial appeal whether the details of Zeb5s testimony were sufficient to
establish that Joseph stabbed Rocky. In addition, Zeb made inconsistent statements at
the preliminary hearing and to police officers regarding statements Joseph may have
made to Zeb. R. 28. Zeb was originally suspected of being the stabber and testimony
from the first day of trial indicated that Zeb, not Joseph, was the person who stabbed
Rocky. R. 141.
B. FACTS PERTINENT TO THE ISSUE ON APPEAL
After the jury acquitted Joseph of attempted homicide and convicted him of
aggravated assault, the trial judge entered judgment of conviction for aggravated assault,
a third degree felony. The third degree felony form of aggravated assault is not a Serious
Youth Offender charge for which a juvenile can be bound over to adult court for trial.
See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602 (l)(a) (1996).

5

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The issue raised in this appeal of whether the district court lost jurisdiction after
Appellant was acquitted of the Serious Youth Offender charge which provided the basis
for the transfer to district court is properly before this Court even though Appellant
pleaded guilty below. A guilty plea does not waive a jurisdictional claim.
The Serious Youth Offender Act requires that the juvenile court regain jurisdiction
when a juvenile is acquitted in district court of the charges which provided the basis for
the transfer to district court under the Act. The plain language of Subsection (10) of the
Act and the Act itself when read in its entirety demonstrate that the Serious Youth
Offender Act requires remand to the juvenile court when the juvenile is acquitted of the
serious offense which provided the basis for the transfer to adult court, even if the
juvenile is convicted of a lesser charge. The legislative history and purpose of the Serious
Youth Offender Act and reading the Act in harmony with the direct file and certification
statutes also demonstrate that the trial court erred in this case when it failed to remand this
case to the juvenile court after Appellant was acquitted of attempted homicide.
ARGUMENT
POINT. THE TRIAL COURT LACKED JURISDICTION TO
SENTENCE JOSEPH AND WAS REQUIRED TO REMAND HIS CASE
TO THE JUVENILE COURT AFTER THE JURY ACQUITTED HIM OF
ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE.
A. THIS ISSUE IS PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT ON APPEAL.

6

After the trial judge ruled that conviction would be entered for the third degree
felony version of aggravated assault, Joseph moved the court to remand his case to
juvenile court, arguing that the district court had lost jurisdiction over the case.
R. 222:5-8. The trial judge denied the motion and sentenced Joseph as an adult.
R. 222:11; 117. Although Joseph did not renew his motion to remand his case to juvenile
court following reversal of his conviction on appeal and subsequently pleaded guilty to a
third degree felony as part of a plea bargain, the issue of whether the trial court had
jurisdiction to sentence Joseph as an adult is nevertheless properly before this Court.2
While a guilty plea generally waives all non-jurisdictional defects, ff[a] plea of
guilty does not waive a claim that the court lacks the power to adjudicate a charge against
defendant." Perank, 858 P.2d 927, 930 (Utah 1992) (further citations omitted); see also
James v. Galetka, 965 P.2d 567 at 570 (subject matter jurisdiction "can neither be waived
nor conferred by consent of the accused"). Indeed, "the issue of subject matter
jurisdiction can be raised at any time." Perank, 858 P.2d at 930 (further citation omitted).

2

This Court issued a sua sponte motion for summary disposition, ordering both
parties to address the issue of whether Joseph waived his right to appeal this jurisdictional
issue when he pleaded guilty following reversal of his conviction on appeal. Joseph
responded that the issue is properly before this Court because jurisdictional issues cannot
be waived. The state responded that the issue is sufficiently complex to warrant full
briefing. Without deciding whether Joseph had waived the jurisdictional issue by
pleading guilty, this Court denied the motion for summary disposition and deferred
consideration of the issue raised in the motion "until plenary presentation and
consideration of the case." See "Order Denying and Deferring Motion for Summary
Disposition" in Addendum E. Joseph therefore addresses this issue in this opening brief.
7

In Perank, the defendant "pleaded guilty to the burglary charge and did not raise
the issue of lack of subject matter jurisdiction with respect to the burglary until the
probation revocation proceeding." Id, The Supreme Court held that Perank's claim that
"the state trial court lacked jurisdiction to convict him of burglary and that the Ute Tribal
Court had exclusive jurisdiction because he is an Indian and the offense occurred within
Indian country" was properly before the Court even though Perank had pled guilty to the
charge. Id.; see also United States v. Morales-Rosales, 838 F.2d 1359, 1361-62 (5th Cir.
1988) ("the failure of an information to charge an offense is a jurisdictional defect that is
not waived by a guilty plea").
The only issue raised in this appeal is whether the adult court lacked jurisdiction to
proceed with the case and sentence Joseph after he was acquitted of the Serious Youth
Offender offense on which he was bound over to that court. Part 6 of Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-3a5 under which Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602 is found, deals explicitly with a
"transfer of jurisdiction" between the juvenile and district court. Because Joseph raises a
jurisdictional defect in this claim that his case should have been remanded to the juvenile
court, the issue was not waived by his guilty plea and is properly before this Court on
appeal.

8

B. PURSUANT TO THE SERIOUS YOUTH OFFENDER ACT, THE
ADULT COURT LOST JURISDICTION OVER THIS CASE AND WAS
REQUIRED TO REMAND THE CASE TO JUVENILE COURT FOR
SENTENCING AFTER THE JURY ACQUITTED JOSEPH OF THE
SERIOUS YOUTH OFFENDER CHARGE WHICH HAD BEEN THE
BASIS FOR THE BINDOVER TO ADULT COURT.
The Serious Youth Offender Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602 (1996) ("the Act"),
allows the juvenile court to transfer a juvenile 16 years or older to adult court for trial on
certain specified felony charges. The Act designates the nine serious, violent crimes
which can be tried in adult court as follows:
78-3a-602. Serious youth offender - Procedure.
(1) Any action filed by a county attorney, district attorney, or
attorney general charging a minor 16 years of age or older with a felony
shall be by criminal information and filed in the juvenile court if the
information charges any of the following offenses:
(a) any felony violation of:
(i) Section 76-6-103, aggravated arson;
(ii) Subsection 76-5-103(l)(a), aggravated assault,
involving intentionally causing serious bodily injury to
another;
(iii) Section 76-5-302, aggravated kidnaping;
(iv) Section 76-6-203, aggravated burglary;
(v) Section 76-6-302, aggravated robbery;
(vi) Section 76-5-405, aggravated sexual assault;
(vii) Section 76-10-508, discharge of
firearm from a vehicle;
(viii) Section 76-5-202, attempted
aggravated murder; or
(ix) Section 76-5-203, attempted murder; or
(b) an offense other than those listed in Subsection
(l)(a) involving the use of a dangerous weapon which would
be a felony if committed by an adult, and the minor has been
previously adjudicated or convicted of an offense involving
9

the use of a dangerous weapon which also would have been a
felony if committed by an adult.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602(l) (1996).
In order to bind a juvenile over to adult court, the Act requires that the state
establish "probable cause to believe that one of the crimes listed in Subsection (1) has
been committed and that the defendant committed it." Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602(3)(a)
(1996). When there is probable cause to believe that the juvenile committed one of the
serious crimes specified in Subsection (1), the juvenile court is able to retain jurisdiction
over the juvenile only in the rare case where all of the retention factors set forth in
Subsection 3(b) are met.3 The essential basis for transferring a case to adult court under
the Act is therefore the charge that the minor committed a serious and violent crime.
By its plain language, Subsection (10) of the Act requires that a case be remanded
to the juvenile court when the defendant is acquitted of the serious offense which

3

The three retention factors are:
(i) the minor has not been previously adjudicated delinquent for an
offense involving the use of a dangerous weapon which would be a felony
if committed by an adult;
(ii) that if the offense was committed with one or more other
persons, the minor appears to have a lesser degree of culpability than the
codefendants; and
(iii) that the minor's role in the offense was not committed in a
violent, aggressive, or premeditated manner.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602(3)(b). The juvenile court found that the retention factors
were not met in this case. R. 12. A finding that the retention factors are not met is made
in the vast majority of Serious Youth Offender cases because the crimes listed in
subsection (1) are, by their very nature, violent, aggressive or premeditated.
10

provided the basis for the bindover. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602(10).
Subsection (10) states, "[t]he juvenile court under Section 78-3a-104 and the Division of
Youth Corrections regain jurisdiction and any authority previously exercised over the
juvenile when there is an acquittal, a finding of not guilty, or dismissal of the charges in
the district court." Id. The term "charges" in Subsection (10) necessarily refers to any
charges which provided the basis for the bindover to district court. In this case, the only
charge which was one of the nine Serious Youth Offender charges, and, indeed, the only
charge on which Joseph was bound over to district court, was attempted homicide.4 Since
Joseph was acquitted of attempted homicide, the plain language of Subsection (10)
required that the juvenile court regain jurisdiction because Joseph was a acquitted of "the
charges" in district court. See State in the Interest of A.B.. 936 P.2d 1091, 1097 (Utah
App. 1997) (where language of statute is plain and unambiguous, statute will ordinarily
be interpreted pursuant to plain language).
While the plain language of Subsection (10) mandates remand of this case to the
juvenile court, even if Subsection (10) were considered to be ambiguous, resort to rules of
statutory construction beyond the plain language rule likewise establishes that the
juvenile court regained jurisdiction when Joseph was acquitted of attempted homicide.

4

Aggravated assault was a lesser included offense requested by the state at trial
after the case was bound over to district court. Since the charge of aggravated assault did
not arise until trial in district court, it could not be one of the "charges" discussed in Utah
Code Ann. § 78-3a-602.
11

lu

[I]f there is doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning or application of the provisions of an

act, it is appropriate to analyze the act in its entirety, in light of its objective, and to
harmonize its provisions in accordance with its intent and purpose .'" State v. Souza, 846
P.2d 1313, 1317 (Utah App. 1993) (citations and quotations omitted). In addition, when a
statute is ambiguous, '"resort to legislative history and purpose for guidance'" is
appropriate. State in the Interest of A.B., 936 P.2d at 1097 (citing State v. Valdez, 933
P.2d 400, 401 (Utah App. 1997) (further citation omitted). Moreover, the Act must be
read in harmony with related statutes, "in this case, Utah's two other statutes for
prosecuting youthful offenders." State in the Interest of AJEL 936 P.2d at 1097 (citation
omitted).
When the Act is read in its entirety, it is apparent that Subsection (10) requires that
a case be remanded to the juvenile court when a juvenile is acquitted of the serious
offense which was the basis for the transfer to adult court. Subsection (10) requires that
the juvenile court regain jurisdiction when the juvenile is acquitted on the "charges";
those "charges" are the Serious Youth Offender charges on which the juvenile was bound
over. In other parts of the Act, the term "charges" refers to the charges pursuant to which
the case was bound over. For example, Subsection (2) states, "[a]ll proceedings before
the juvenile court related to charges filed under Subsection (1) shall be conducted in
conformity with the rules established by the Utah Supreme Court." Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-3a-602 (2) (emphasis added). Subsection (7) likewise refers to the charges on which
12

the juvenile is bound over to district court. The use of the term "charges" throughout the
Act to refer to the charges originating in juvenile court on which the case is bound over
demonstrates that the term "charges" in Subsection (10) refers to the Serious Youth
Offender charges which qualify the case for adult court. Since Subsection (10) requires
that the juvenile court regains jurisdiction if the juvenile is acquitted of the "charges," this
subsection mandates that the adult court lost jurisdiction when Joseph was acquitted of
the Serious Youth Offender charge.
Legislative history and the purpose for which the Act was adopted also
demonstrate that Subsection (10) was intended to require that a case be remanded to
juvenile court when the juvenile is acquitted of the serious offense which provided the
basis for transferring the case to adult court. The Legislative purpose for enacting the Act
was to require that juveniles 16 and 17 years of age who commit violent and aggressive
offenses, making them as dangerous as adult criminals, be dealt with in the adult system.
State in the Interest of A.B.. 936 P.2d at 1098-1099. The Legislature intended that violent
and aggressive 16 and 17 year olds, most of whom would eventually end up in the adult
system, be removed from the juvenile system when they commit one of the nine "very
serious aggravated offenses" identified by the Legislature as being so violent and
aggressive that transfer to the adult system is warranted. Id.; see also Utah House and
Senate Floor Debates, 51st Legislature, General Session (February 9, 1995 and March 1,
1995) at 3, 11, 14, attached as Addendum F.
13

The Legislature's focus was on holding hardened, seriously violent juvenile
offenders accountable in the adult system. Id at 3, 4, 14. In passing the Act, the
Legislature recognized that mechanisms existed in the adult system that would preclude
youth who commit such offenses from going to prison if such lack of incarceration was
appropriate. Id. In addition, the Legislature included Subsection (10) which mandates
that the juvenile court regain jurisdiction if the youth is acquitted of the charges. When
Subsection (10) is read in light of the legislative purpose to more severely punish in the
adult system only those youth who commit very serious aggravated offenses, it is evident
that Subsection (10) requires that the case be remanded to the juvenile court when there is
not a conviction for the serious, violent offense which was the basis for the transfer to
adult court.
Reading the Serious Youth Offender Act in harmony with the two related statutes
which deal with prosecuting youthful offenders provides additional support for
interpreting Subsection (10) to require remand when a juvenile is acquitted of the Serious
Youth Offender offense which provided the basis for transfer of the case to adult court.
The two related statutes for prosecuting minors in adult court are Utah Code Ann. § 783a-601 (1996), which requires direct filing in adult court under certain limited
circumstances, and Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-603 (1996), which provides for certification
of juveniles to be tried as adults under certain circumstances. See State in the Interest of
A.B..936P.2datl097.
14

Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-601, the direct file statute, mandates that the district court
has original jurisdiction over juveniles 16 and older when the juvenile is charged with
murder or aggravated murder, or if the juvenile was previously committed to a secure
facility. There is no provision in Section 78-3a-601 for remand to the juvenile court if the
juvenile is acquitted of the direct file charges.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-603 provides for the certification of juveniles to district
court when the juvenile judge finds that such certification is appropriate based on a
finding of one or more of the factors set forth in the statute. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-603
contains a subsection with language almost identical to that of Subsection (10) of the Act,
which provides that the juvenile court regains jurisdiction "when there is an acquittal, a
finding of not guilty, or dismissal of the charges in the district court." Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-3a-603 (14).5 The certification statute, however, contains an additional provision
which arguably allows the case to remain in district court if the juvenile is convicted of a
lesser offense or any charges arising from the same criminal episode. Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-3a-603(13). Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-603(13) states, "[a] minor may be convicted
under this section on the charges filed or on any other offense arising out of the same
criminal episode." No such language is included in the Serious Youth Offender Act.
When the Serious Youth Offender Act is considered in conjunction with the direct

5

Subsection (14) of the certification statute is identical to Subsection (10) of the
Act except that it substitutes the word "minor" for the word "juvenile."
15

file and certification statutes, it is apparent that the Legislature intended that in the
context of the Serious Youth Offender Act, the juvenile would be returned to juvenile
court if he were not convicted in adult court of the serious, aggravated felony which was
the basis for the transfer. On the one hand, by not including language requiring remand to
the juvenile court in the direct file statute, the Legislature indicated that when a case is
directly filed in adult court, the case stays in adult court regardless of the outcome.
Conversely, by including language requiring remand in the Serious Youth Offender Act,
the Legislature signaled an intent to return a case to juvenile court when the basis for the
transfer—commission of one of the nine serious and violent crimes specified by the
Legislature—is not proved.
The Legislature's approach to the regaining of jurisdiction by the juvenile court in
the certification statute likewise demonstrates that the Legislature intended that a Serious
Youth Offender case be returned to the juvenile court when a juvenile is not convicted of
the Serious Youth Offender offense. While the precise meaning of the additional
language in Subsection (13) of the certification statute is unclear, it nevertheless is clear
that the Legislature chose to include additional language in the certification statute
clarifying that the procedure outlined in the certification statute applies to the charges
filed and any other offenses arising out the same criminal episode. Conversely, by not
including language similar to that of Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-603(13) in the Serious
Youth Offender Act, the Legislature signaled that the provisions of the Serious Youth
16

Offender Act apply only when a juvenile is convicted of the serious youth offender
charges.
The Legislature's choice of more expansive language which includes any offense
arising out of the criminal episode in the certification statute furthers the purposes served
by the certification statute. In deciding whether to certify a juvenile to district court, the
juvenile court considers a number of factors, including the likelihood of rehabilitation.
State in the Interest of A.B.. 936 P.2d at 1098; Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-603(3). The
seriousness of the offense, while one of the factors to be considered in the certification
context, does not have the overriding influence that it does in the Serious Youth Offender
context. In fact, the juvenile court considers the nature of the juvenile at least as much as
it does the nature of the crime when it decides to certify a case for adult court treatment.
After a juvenile court has considered the relevant factors and concluded that a juvenile
should be certified to adult court, conviction on a lesser included offense therefore does
not disturb the rationale for certifying the case to adult court. By contrast, when a minor
is charged with a Serious Youth Offender crime, the rationale for transferring the case to
adult court is destroyed when the minor is acquitted of the violent crime which was the
basis for the transfer.
The Legislature clearly knew how to preclude remand to the juvenile court and
how to limit remand in situations where the juvenile was convicted of other crimes arising
out of the same criminal episode. Had the Legislature intended to preclude remand under
17

the Serious Youth Offender Act when a juvenile was convicted of a lesser included
offense, it would have included language to that effect. Reading the Serious Youth
Offender Act together with the direct file and certification statutes demonstrates that the
Legislature intended that a case be remanded to juvenile court if the minor is acquitted of
the Serious Youth Offender charge which provided the basis for transfer to district court.
See generally State in the Interest of A.EL 936 P.2d at 1098 (using a similar analysis to
conclude that "the Legislature did not intend that the juvenile court consider a juvenile's
rehabilitative prospects11 under the Serious Youth Offender Act").
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602(10) mandates that the juvenile court regain
jurisdiction when the juvenile is acquitted of the Serious Youth Offender charges which
provided the basis for the transfer to adult court. Such an interpretation is consistent with
the plain language, the statute when it is read in its entirety, related statutes for
prosecuting youthful offenders, and the purpose for which the Act was passed.
In this case, Joseph was charged only with attempted homicide, one of the
specified Serious Youth Offender offenses, and bound over to district court on that
charge. R. 9, 11-12; see Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602(l)(a)(ix). He was acquitted of the
charge on which he was bound over, and convicted of a non-Serious Youth Offender
charge. R. 109, 108. Accordingly, the trial court committed reversible error when it
refused to remand the case to juvenile court after Joseph was acquitted of the "charges."
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CONCLUSION
Defendant/Appellant Joseph Tunzi respectfully requests that this Court order that
his adult court conviction be stricken and his case remanded to the juvenile court for entry
of a juvenile conviction in that court.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this i&L day of December, 2000.

JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that I have caused to be hand-delivered the
original and seven copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State
Street, 5th Floor, P. O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230, and four copies to
the Utah Attorney General's Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South,
6th Floor, P. O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this Ja> day of
December, 2000.

JOAN C. WATT
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DELIVERED to the Utah Court of Appeals and the Utah Attorney General's
Office as indicated above this
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ADDENDUM B

78-3a-601. Jurisdiction of district court.
The district court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all persons
16 years of age or older charged by information or indictment with:
(1) an offense which would be murder or aggravated murder if committed by an adult; or
(2) an offense which would be a felony if committed by an adult if the
TtiiTtnr has been previously committed to a secure facility as defined in
Section 62A-7-101.

78-3a-602. Serious youth offender — Procedure.
(1) Any action filed by a county attorney, district attorney, or attorney
general charging a minor 16 years of age or older with a felony shall be by
criminal information and filed in the juvenile court if the information charges
any of the following offenses:
(a) any felony violation of:
(i) Section 76-6-103, aggravated arson;
(ii) Subsection 76-5-103(l)(a), aggravated assault, involving intentionally causing serious bodily injury to another;
(iii) Section 76-5-302, aggravated kidnaping;
(iv) Section 76-6-203, aggravated burglary;
(v) Section 76-6-302, aggravated robbery,
(vi) Section 76-5-405, aggravated sexual assault;
(vii) Section 76-10-508, discharge of a firearm from a vehicle;
(viii) Section 76-5-202, attempted aggravated murder; or
(ix) Section 76-5-203, attempted murder, or
(b) an offense other than those listed in Subsection (lXa) involving the
use of a dangerous weapon which would be a felony if committed by an
adult, and the minor has been previously adjudicated or convicted of an
offense involving the use of a dangerous weapon which also would have
been a felony if committed by an adult.
(2) All proceedings before the juvenile court related to charges filed under
Subsection (1) shall be conducted in conformity with the rules established by
the Utah Supreme Court.
(3) (a) If the information alleges the violation of a felony listed in Subsection (1), the state shall have the burden of going forward with its case and
the burden of proof to establish probable cause to believe that one of the
crimes listed in Subsection (1) has been committed and that the defendant
committed it. If proceeding under Subsection (l)(b), the state shall have
the additional burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that
the defendant has previously been adjudicated or convicted of an offense
involving the use of a dangerous weapon.
(b) If the juvenile court judge finds the state has met its burden under
this subsection, the court shall order that the defendant be bound over and

held to answer in the district court in the same manner as an adult unless
the juvenile court judge finds that all of the following conditions exist:
(i) the minor has not been previously adjudicated delinquent for an
offense involving the use of a dangerous weapon which would be a
felony if committed by an adult;
(ii) that if the offense was committed with one or more other
persons, the minor appears to have a lesser degree of culpability than
the codefendants; and
(iii) that the minor's role in the offense was not committed in a
violent, aggressive, or premeditated manner.
(c) Once the state has met its burden under this subsection as to a
showing of probable cause, the defendant shall have the burden of going
forward and presenting evidence as to the existence of the above conditions.
(d) If the juvenile court judge finds by clear and convincing evidence
that all the above conditions are satisfied, the court shall so state in its
findings and order the minor held for trial as a minor and shall proceed
upon the information as though it were a juvenile petition.
(4) If the juvenile court judge finds that an offense has been committed, but
that the state has not met its burden of proving the other criteria needed to
bind the defendant over under Subsection (1), the juvenile court judge shall
order the defendant held for trial as a minor and shall proceed upon the
information as though it were a juvenile petition.
(5) At the time of a bind over to district court a criminal warrant of arrest
shall issue. The defendant shall have the same right to bail as any other
criminal defendant and shall be advised of that right by the juvenile court
judge. The juvenile court shall set initial bail in accordance with Title 77,
Chapter 20, Bail.
(6) If an indictment is returned by a grand jury charging a violation under
this section, the preliminary examination held by the juvenile court judge need
not include a finding of probable cause that the crime alleged in the indictment
was committed and that the defendant committed it, but the juvenile court
shall proceed in accordance with this section regarding the additional considerations listed in Subsection (3)(b).
(7) When a defendant is charged with multiple criminal offenses in the same
information or indictment and is bound over to answer in the district court for
one or more charges under this section, other offenses arising from the same
criminal episode and any subsequent misdemeanors or felonies charged
against him shall be considered together with those charges, and where the
court finds probable cause to believe that those crimes have been committed
and that the defendant committed them, the defendant shall also be bound
over to the district court to answer for those charges.
(8) A minor who is bound over to answer as an adult in the district court
under this section or on whom an indictment has been returned by a grand
jury, is not entitled to a preliminary examination in the district court.
(9) Allegations contained in the indictment or information that the defendant has previously been adjudicated or convicted of an offense involving the
use of a dangerous weapon, or is 16 years of age or older, are not elements of
the criminal offense and do not need to be proven at trial in the district court.
(10) The juvenile court under Section 78-3a-104 and the Division of Youth
Corrections regain jurisdiction and any authority previously exercised over the
juvenile when there is an acquittal, a finding of not guilty, or dismissal of the
charges in the district court.

78-3a-603. Certification hearings — Juvenile court to
hold preliminary hearing — Factors considered
by juvenile court for waiver of jurisdiction to
district court.
(1) If a criminal information filed in accordance with Subsection 78~3a502(3) alleges the commission of an act which would constitute a felony if
committed by an adult, the juvenile court shall conduct a preliminary hearing.
(2) At the preliminary hearing the state shall have the burden of going
forward with its case and the burden of establishing:
(a) probable cause to believe that a crime was committed and that the
defendant committed it; and
(b) by a preponderance of the evidence, that it would be contrary to the
best interests of the minor or of the public for the juvenile court to retain
jurisdiction.
(3) In considering whether or not it would be contrary to the best interests
of the minor or of the public for the juvenile court to retain jurisdiction, the
juvenile court shall consider, and may base its decision on, thefindingof one or
more of the following factors:
(a) the seriousness of the offense and whether the protection of the
community requires isolation of the minor beyond that afforded by
juvenile facilities;
(b) whether the alleged offense was committed by the minor in concert
with two or more persons under circumstances which would subject the
minor to enhanced penalties under Section 76-3-203.1 were he an adult;
(c) whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent,
premeditated, or willful manner,
(d) whether the alleged offense was against persons or property, greater
weight being given to offenses against persons, except as provided in
Section 76-8-418;
(e) the maturity of the minor as determined by considerations of his
home, environment, emotional attitude, and pattern of living;
(f) the record and previous history of the minor;
(g) the likelihood of rehabilitation of the minor by use of facilities
available to the juvenile court;

(h) the desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one
court when the minor's associates in the alleged offense are adults who
will be charged with a crime in the district court;
(i) whether the minor used a firearm in the commission of an offense;
and
(j) whether the minor possessed a dangerous weapon on or about school
premises as provided in Section 76-10-505.5.
(4) The amount of weight to be given to each of the factors listed in
Subsection (3) is discretionary with the court.
(5) (a) Written reports and other materials relating to the minor's mental,
physical, educational, and social history may be considered by the court.
(b) If requested by the minor, the minor's parent, guardian, or other
interested party, the court shall require the person or agency preparing
the report and other material to appear and be subject to both direct and
cross-examination.
(6) At the conclusion of the state's case, the minor may testify under oath,
call witnesses, cross-examine adverse witnesses, and present evidence on the
factors required by Subsection (3).
(7) If the court finds the state has met its burden under Subsection (2), the
court may enter an order:
(a) certifying that finding; and
(b) directing that the minor be held for criminal proceedings in the
district court.
(8) If an indictment is returned by a grand jury, the preliminary examination held by the juvenile court need not include afindingof probable cause, but
the juvenile court shall proceed in accordance with this section regarding the
additional consideration referred to in Subsection (2Kb).
(9) The provisions of Section 78-3a-512, Section 78-3a-513, and other
provisions relating to proceedings in juvenile cases are applicable to the
hearing held under this section to the extent they are pertinent.
(10) A minor who has been directed to be held for criminal proceedings in
the district court is not entitled to a preliminary examination in the district
court.
(11) A minor who has been certified for trial in the district court shall have
the same right to bail as any other criminal defendant and shall be advised of
that right by the juvenile court judge. The juvenile coin! shall set initial bail
in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 20, Bail.
(12) When a minor has been certified to the district court under this section
or when a criminal information or indictment is filed in a court of competent
jurisdiction before a committing magistrate charging the minor with an offense
described in Section 78-3a-602, the jurisdiction of the Division of Youth
Corrections and the jurisdiction of the juvenile court over the minor is
terminated regarding that offense, any other offenses arising from the same
criminal episode, and any subsequent misdemeanors or felonies charged
against him, except as provided in Subsection (14).
(13) A minor may be convicted under this section on the charges filed or on
any other offense arising out of the same criminal episode.
(14) The juvenile court under Section 78-3a-104 and the Division of Youth
Corrections regain jurisdiction and any authority previously exercised over the
minor when there is an acquittal, a finding of not guilty, or dismissal of the
charges in the district court.

ADDENDUM C

INSTRUCTION NO.
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If after careful consideration, you are unable to find that the defendant, Joseph P. Tunzi
committed the crime of Attempted Homicide, as charged in the information, you are instructed to
consider whether the defendant committed the lesser included crime of Aggravated Assault, if
you find from all of the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt, each and every on^of the
following elements of that offense:
1.

That on or about the 1st day of November, 1998, in Salt Lake County State of

Utah, the defendant, Joseph P. Tunzi assaulted John R. Vigil and
2.

That the said defendant intentionally or knowingly assaulted John R. Vigil and

3.

That the said defendant then and there intentionally caused serious bodily injury

to John R. Vigil; or
4.

That the said defendant used a dangerous weapon or other means of force likely to

produce death or serious bodily injury.
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are convinced of the
truth of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you may
find the defendant guilty of the lesser included crime of Aggravated Assault in lieu of Count I,
Attempted Homicide, of the information. If, on the other hand, you are not convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt of any one or more of the foregoing elements, then you must find the defendant
not guilty of Aggravated Assault.
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This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
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State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Joseph P. Tunzi,
Defendant and Petitioner.
No. 20000022
FILED
April 14, 2000
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Third District Court, Salt Lake Dep't
The Honorable Judith S. H. Atherton
Attorneys:
Jan Graham, Att'y Gen., Laura B. Dupaix, Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff
Joan C. Watt, John O'Connell, Jr., Salt Lake City, for defendant

On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
MEMORANDUM DECISION and ORDER
DURHAM, Justice:
1J1 Petitioner, Joseph P. Tunzi, by writ of certiorari, seeks review of an order of remand issued by the court of
appeals directing the trial court to prepare and approve a "statement of the evidence or proceedings" pursuant
to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 11 (g). We grant petitioner's writ of certiorari, reverse the court of appeals,
and remand the case to the trial court for a new trial.
112 Following a two-day trial, petitioner was convicted of aggravated assault, a third degree felony, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1999). Subsequent to his conviction, petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal
raising the following two issues:
(1) Whether there was insufficient evidence for the jury to convict petitioner of aggravated
assault; and
(2) Whether the trial court erred in failing to find that it had lost jurisdiction and failing to remand
the case back to juvenile court.
Petitioner's counsel thereafter learned that the trial court was unable to locate the videotape of the second day

of trial, and that a transcript of that day would therefore not be available. As a result, petitioner filed a motion for
summary reversal in the court of appeals seeking a new trial. The State agreed that such a reversal was
appropriate. Ultimately, the court of appeals denied petitioner's motion for summary reversal and remanded the
case with instructions to reconstruct the record of the second day of trial.
113 We disagree with the court of appeals' action upon petitioner's motion for summary reversal. A main issue
on appeal in this case is whether there is sufficient evidence in the record to support petitioner's conviction.
Resolution of this issue will necessarily involve reviewing the evidence contained in the record. At present, the
record does not contain evidence presented on the second day of petitioner's two-day trial. During that day, the
State called half of its witnesses, including the only witness directly implicating petitioner. Thus, fully one half of
the case against petitioner is missing from the record. While reconstruction of the record may be appropriate in
circumstances where only a minor portion of the record is missing, such an attempt, in our experience, is
unduly burdensome for the trial court and the parties when a major portion of the record is missing, as in the
instant case. Moreover, attempts to reconstruct major portions of records often prove to be futile because such
reconstructions often fail to provide the detail necessary to resolve the issues on appeal. The burdens and
futility associated with reconstructing a record are increased exponentially when the issue on appeal concerns
the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction, as it does here. Therefore, to avoid needless burdens
and delay, we reverse the court of appeals and remand this case to the trial court for a new trial.

fl4 Chief Justice Howe, Associate Chief Justice Russon, Justice Durrant, and Justice Wilkins concur in Justice
Durham's opinion.
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State of Utah,

v.

ORDER DENYING AND
DEFERRING MOTION FOR
SUMMARY DISPOSITION

Joseph Tunzi,

Case No. 20000728-CA

Plaintiff and Appellee,

Defendant and Appellant.

This matter is before the court on its own motion for
summary disposition. Both parties oppose the motion. IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that the motion is denied and that the issues
raised are deferred until plenary presentation and consideration
of the case.
Briefing will be set, when appropriate, by separate notice.
DATED this 1 / day of October, 2000.
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Judith M. Billings, Judge
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ADDENDUM F

SENATE BILL 111
SERIOUS YOUTH OFFENDER

SENATE DEBATE
51ST LEGISLATURE
GENERAL SESSION
DAY 25--FEBRUARY 9, 1995
TAPE 2 0 AT 752
Secretary:

Senate Bill 111, Serious Youth Offender, by
Senator Hillyard and the Committee Report
February 6, 1995: "Mr. President, the Human
Services Committee reports a favorable
recommendation on Senate Bill 111 with
amendments on pages 7, 8, 9, 13, and 13.
Respectfully, Charles Stewart, Acting
Committee Chair."
Move we adopt the Committee Report.

Mr. President:

Motion to adopt the Committee Report.
those in favor say "aye."

All

Body:

Aye.

Mr. President:

Are there any opposed?

Body:

(None)

Mr. President:

Seeing no opposition, the bill is before us,
Senate Bill 111. Senator Hillyard.

Sen. Hillyard:

Thank you, Mr. President. I want to direct
the Senate's attention to the fact that this
is probably going to be one of the most
important pieces of legislation that we
consider this session as it relates to crime,
and it's a part of a package. It's not the
sole crime package, but it's part of it.
The body may also remember a year ago, I
filed the bill under the same name, quite a
bit different from this bill. It was Senate
Bill 249. We had a very interesting debate
in which I had opposition from a number of
people in law enforcement because I felt that
it was doing the proper thing to give more
power to the juvenile court judges to address
the serious problems of gang and youth
violence.

This body chose to adopt and pass that bill
unanimously. We realized in passing it, it
carried a significant fiscal note, but we
also knew that it would be giving a message
that we wanted something done in this area.
And I can report back-- since that action in
the past year, there has been a tremendous
amount of work by all the various agencies to
have come together to bring to you Senate
Bill 111, which is a serious youth offender
bill.
This bill is being supported by a number of
people including the Governor, the Commission
on Criminal and Juvenile Justice, Utah
Sentencing Commission, Utah Substance Abuse
and Anti-violence Council, Utah Judicial
Council, juvenile court judges (and I should
indicate that the juvenile court judges have
felt left out in the process, now feel very
much a part of this process in coming to
grips with this), Board of Youth Corrections,
Utah Law Enforcement Legislative Committee,
and many, many others.
Let me just indicate that the bill does three
things. Number one, it provides that if a
youth 16 or 17 years old is charged with
aggravated murder or murder, which was
formerly called first or second degree
murder, if they're charged with this, they
will be automatically transferred and treated
in the adult system.
One of the issues now pending before the Utah
Supreme Court involves a young man here in
Salt Lake City who shot and killed another
person, I think at the Triad Center. The
case up on appeal is whether our current
system is legal, where you can be certified
or directly filed at the discretion of the
prosecutor. The issue is whether, how much
discretion the prosecutor can have. And this
bill takes away from that, and if the
prosecutor chooses to charge as first or
second degree murder, aggravated or murder,
the young man or young woman is automatically
treated in the adult system.
The second place where it automatically goes
is if that youth has been committed to a
secure facility. They use the term committed
2

in juvenile court. We would talk about
confinement in a jail. But the committed,
and then commits a felony, which is another
serious offense, then they automatically are
placed in the adult system. The reason being
is the feeling is that if you have been
committed in the juvenile court system, that
is the most severe punishment they can give
to you. And if that hasn't worked, the
feeling is that you now completed the, what
is available in the juvenile court system,
and you will now, as the saying goes, if you
commit an adult crime, you'll spend adult
time.
The third issue this case creates, and a
thing that I really like about it, is that it
lists a number of very serious aggravated
offenses such as aggravated arson, aggravated
assault, aggravated kidnapping, etc. If that
is committed by a youth 16 or 17 years of
age, then there's a process set up whereby he
is certified over to district court but can
be retained by the juvenile court. So the
juvenile court will have a chance to hear
that in a preliminary hearing type situation
and be able to make a decision that, no,
there are programs for this youth that would
still make him amenable to what can be done
in juvenile court and he would be retained.
It does away with the direct filing so the
court, the prosecutor will not be able to
directly file any more, but will go through a
preliminary hearing process in front of the
juvenile court for those youth under the age
of 16. At our committee hearing, we had an
argument by the ACLU that this violated
constitutional rights. I'm reminded of a
statement my good friend Senator Chic Bullen
said, if you get four lawyers together
arguing what is due process, you'll get six
different opinions. But I can assure you
that this bill has been examined very
carefully by lawyers on that issue of due
process and feel satisfied that it does
satisfy the due process requirement.
Another question came up in committee whether
we ought to lower that age from 16 to 15.
The 16 age was taken because there are a
number of factors that occur at 16, but also
3

in looking at the implementation of this
bill, the current data would show that there
are probably going to be between 5 0 and 7 5
youth that will be impacted by that that have
just been in place. To lower that age, we
may come back and want to do that. But this
time, as we move forward, we think the
appropriate age is 16 and that's the line
that we want to draw.
Again, the message, we hope, and it's a
tragic part of our society, that there's
going to be youth who are going to end up in
the state prison because of their actions.
But the feeling is that there is mechanisms
within the adult system that if they really
don't warrant going to state prison, they can
be protected; but, on the other hand, many of
these youths or most of these youths will end
up in prison anyway, and we may as well get
them down there and protect society during
that time period.
This bill has been included in the Governor's
budget for funding, has a fiscal note
obviously with it. But as I've indicated to
the committee and I'll indicate to you, it's
only a part of the Governor's program. The
other very important part is to address the
things that we need to do in prevention.
Some of the programs in public education the
Governor's already led into to do and that
we've done, I think, will impact what we're
doing. Also, I think this gives a signal
that will be helpful in the areas of
prevention. And the other part of the parcel
will be, sadly enough, construction of more
prison space or making available. Some of
these youths, quite frankly, are a severe
danger not only to themselves but to society
and should be removed from the streets.
Mr. President, that is a synopsis of Senate
Bill 111. Again, has wide and broad base
support. I think it is an important step for
this Legislature to take.
Mr. President:

Thank you.

Senator Hull.

Sen. Hull:

Thank you. I was in the committee when this
was heard, and I do have some concern. I am
supportive of this bill. My concern is the
age at which they can be certified for the
4

district court, which is 16.
discussed.

And it's been

Sen. Hillyard:

They can certify below the age of 16.

Sen. Hull:

That is correct.

Sen. Hillyard:

It's automatic at 16.

Sen. Hull:

It is automatic at 16. And my concern, and
I've asked this question on several of the
bills that have come up dealing with juvenile
justice, why they selected 16, and it's kind
of a random age, and I've received several
answers. One that, I guess the best answer
was that's the age you get a license so
you're more accountable. But there will be
other bills coming through, and I think I
will make, try to make an amendment to make
that lower, and another one dealing with
confidentiality. But I'm wondering, really
in our society where these kids are in
schools, it's drilled into their minds that
at age Ninth Grade that, as least as far as
their academic behaviors are concerned, those
go in to stone, those credits and all their
behaviors and that are kept on school records
for public use for the rest of their lives,
from Ninth Grade on. And I'm wondering, if
we ought to not, since that is already
embedded in their minds that they should be
accountable then, the colleges use the Ninth,
Tenth and Eleventh Grades for their
accountabilities, if not that is the age
where they ought to be taught in the courts
to be accountable, too. That's my only
concern. I am for, supportive of this bill
as is.

Sen. Hillyard:

I appreciate Senator Hull raising that issue.
And in response to it, in talking to Camille
Anthony, who is the director of CCDJ, her
comment was again, in checking back over,
they wanted to keep it at age 16 to see how
the thing works out. And if it turns out,
Senator Hull, I would be more than happy to
have you sponsor the bill to lower the age.

Mr. President:

Senator Howell.

Sen. Howell:

Thank you, Mr. President. Maybe we can just
make a little amendment here to do that
5

little friendly amendment, Camille.
would that be?

How

Sen. Hillyard:

To faint,
age.

Sen. Howell

Senator Hillyard, as you know, I had the bill
with regards to concealed weapons and minors,
and that was one that I was very concerned
about because on a daily basis, we see, not
on a daily basis but quite often, we see
young people who are carrying concealed
weapons walking up and down Main Street and
so on and so forth. How would that, how
would your bill deal with those offenders?

Sen. Hillyard:

We clarify a conflict in the law currently.
There's a conflict in the law because
prosecutors can tell you that they can
directly file on anyone directly in an adult
court.

Sen. Howell:

Right.

Sen. Hillyard:

That's what they did in the case of the West
High student.

Sen. Howell:

Right.

Sen. Hillyard:

The juvenile court judges will tell you, in
reading the law, they can't do that and they
can bring them back. Now we resolve that
issue. They can no longer directly file.
What's going to happen, if you're 16 or
older, one of these crimes, then you'll go
directly to an adult system. If you're under
age 16, you will then file in juvenile court
but request the juvenile court certify the
youth over. So you could have a 14 year old
who could be, in fact, certified over and
treated as an adult, but the juvenile court
would have a preliminary hearing to decide
whether that transfer ought to be made.

Sen. Howell:

So the juvenile justice then would make the
recommendation to bind them over as an adult?

Sen. Hillyard:

That's correct.

Sen. Howell:

Okay. Are we confident, and I guess this
gets back to the age factor, are we confident
that in those cases that they'll do it? Like

No.
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I would resist changing the

when there•s a 14 year old who has been
involved in a felony, let's say? I mean, how
do I get warm fuzzies that they're going to
make this decision about turning them over?
I mean, that's my concern, is that kid,
individual, who sees no future but they're
willing to shoot someone.
Sen. Hillyard:

Well, let me tell you the problem we had last
year and what got the opposition to my bill
was the frustration of juvenile court judges
that they would get a young man or young
woman and say, "You're going to spend eight
months in a secure facility," walk out of the
court, and youth correction would say, "We
don't have the room for you, you're out of
here." It was a joke. And so what we've
really done is now given the juvenile court
more play in what they're going to do.

Sen. Howell

Okay. And that, that's the very situation is
to say, "We're filled up, sorry you've
committed this terrible heinous crime, but we
can't take any more." So I think that, if
what you're saying is now they have an
alternative to say, "You're certified as an
adult," or, a 16 year old, "You're out of
here." Great!

Sen. Hillyard:

And that's correct. And that's part of the
package. I mean, to do this bill alone
without the prevention, without more bed
space, would be a mockery to the system and,
I think, a fraud on the people of the state
of Utah. We're doing all three of them.

Sen. Howell:

Mr. President, I withdrew my senate bill with
regards to juveniles and possession of guns
for this very reason. And this satisfies all
the requirements that I had in that bill, so
I commend Senator Hillyard for doing a great
job on this.

Mr. President:

Thank you, Senator Howell. Senator Hillyard.
Are there any further questions of Senator
Hillyard? Senator Hillyard, would you like
to sum up. Oh, excuse me, Senator
McAllister.

Sen. McAllister:

Senator Hillyard, I have a concern with
regard to the fiscal note that's on page 21.
And you show there the first full year costs.
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Now those figures, now if I understand
correctly, you expect that there would be 2
murders within that first full year, 15 first
degree, and so on, is that correct?
Sen. Hillyard:

I'd have to, I'd have to go to Camille, who
has put this in.

Sen. McAllister:

Is that a proper assumption?

Sen. Hillyard:

Yes.

Sen. McAllister:

Well, the concern I have then, if you look 10
years from now, you're expecting 9 times more
murders, over 10, probably 12 times more
first degree, probably 3-1/2 times more
felonies, and so on. Do you really feel that
in 10 years, we're going to be living in an
environment, in a society where such crimes,
or is it just population? I'm really
overwhelmed with that kind of statistics.

Sen. Hillyard:

I understand. It's a cumulative buildup type
thing in the system. But, again, I can have
somebody address that fiscal note directly if
you want. But my understanding is, is that
the 18 reflects a buildup of over those time
periods.

Sen. McAllister:

I see then. It says 10th year, and there's
nothing to indicate accumulative on that.
Are you saying then that the fiscal note for
the first year would be $1,338,000, but
because we're dealing with a part of a year,
it's $351,800?

Sen. Hillyard:

That's correct.

Sen. McAllister:

But in the 10th year, we're not looking at
$8,000,000 in that year alone (but that's in
a sense what it says), but you're saying,
then if the first year is $1,338,000, it
ought to be something like 10 times that in
the 10th year, and it isn't.

Sen. Hillyard:

I would have to have Leo, who prepared the
fiscal note, as you know, he doesn't go just
directly on what somebody tells him, he put
some things together. I'd be glad to answer
it on the third reading.

Sen. McAllister:

I think that's fine, but I'd like an answer
8

on that, if you would, please, on the third.
Sen. Hillyard:

I'll get that information.

Mr. President:

Any further questions of Senator Hillyard?
Mr. President.

Sen. Hillyard:

Mr. President, before I sum up, personal
privilege, I have an unrelated matter.

Mr. President, in summation, I think that
we've pointed out very well this is a bill
that's been worked on very hard by a number
of people. I am fortunate enough to be just
merely a spokesman to represent hundreds of
hours that have been put on this problem. We
realize this is not going to solve the
problem, it's a combination of other things
that need to be put together. But I think
it's an excellent beginning, and I would urge
the support of this body, and I'd call for a
question on the bill.
Mr. President

Thank you, Senator Hillyard.

HOUSE DEBATE
51ST LEGISLATURE
GENERAL SESSION
DAY 45--MARCH 1, 1995
TAPE 1 AT 54 52
Reading Clerk:

Senate Bill 111, Serious Youth Offender, by
Lyle W. Hillyard. Committee vote: 9 yes,
0 no, 3 absent.

Mr. Speaker:

Representative Fox.

Rep. Fox:

Yes, thank you, Mr. Speaker. Before I begin,
1 would like to move the amendments that have
been passed out under my name for Senate
Bill 111. Perhaps we ought to check and make
sure the body has those. Just been passed
out, just recently.
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Mr. Speaker:

Those who do not
Senate Bill 111,
see. The circle
circle and go on

Rep. Fox:

That will be just fine while the
pages . . . .

Mr. Speaker:

I have a motion to circle Senate Bill 111.
Discussion that motion. Saying that, all in
favor say "aye."

Body:

Aye.

Mr. Speaker:

Opposed "no."

Body :

(None)

Mr. Speaker:

The motion carries. The bill is circled.
Madam Reading Clerk.

Rep. Fox:

Thank you, Mr. Speaker. I would move that we
uncircle Senate Bill 111.

Mr. Speaker:

We have a motion to remove the circle from
Senate Bill 111. Would you state the title.

Rep. Fox:

Yes, Serious Youth Offender.

Mr. Speaker:

Discussion of the motion to uncircle,
none, all in favor say "aye."

Body:

Aye.

Mr. Speaker:

Opposed "no."

Body:

(None)

Mr. Speaker:

The motion carries,
You may proceed.

Rep. Fox:

Yes, thank you. I think everyone now has the
amendments that were just passed out. I
would like to move those amendments on page
19, line 21 and after 1, delete "proceedings"
and insert " except as provided in section
78-3a-25 and 78-3a-25.1 proceedings" and page
19, line 29, after "violations" insert
"criminal proceedings under section 78-3a-25
and 78-3a-25.1 or to establish the
10

have the amendments of
raise your hand so we can
does not, maybe we ought to
for a minute.

Seeing

The bill is uncircled.

jurisdiction of the court under section 783a-16(l). M Now, what that does is currently
our code states that juvenile court evidence
may not be used any place else other than the
juvenile court. To effect the provisions of
SB111, Serious Youth Offender, we need to
exempt the crimes committed that would fall
under this bill. So we wanted to, we have to
make that exemption in the current code.
Mr. Speaker:

The motion is that we accept the pink sheet
amendment under Representative Fox's name
dated February 23, 1995 at 5:08 p.m.
Discussion of the motion to amend. Seeing
none, all those in favor of the motion to
amend say "aye."

Body:

Aye.

Mr. Speaker:

Opposed "no."

Body:

(None)

Mr. Speaker:

The motion carries.
You may proceed.

Rep. Fox:

Thank you, Mr. Speaker. Unfortunately, Utah
has seen a tremendous expansion of our young
people who are committing serious crimes-murder, all sorts of drive-by shootings. We
see all these things happening. Frankly,
we're at a loss to how to deal with these
young criminals. They are still under age,
but they are hardened criminals nonetheless.

The bill is amended.

The serious youth offender bill is the
product of a year-long effort from Utah's
criminal and juvenile justice professionals
to create a new category of crime that will
safeguard the public and hold violent and
chronic juvenile offenders accountable. What
it does is it makes it so the district court
has exclusive original jurisdiction over
juveniles age 16 and older charged with
aggravated murder, murder and any felony
committed subsequent to confinement in the
most secure youth offender facilities.
Juveniles age 16 years and older who commit
one of the other ten serious offenses against
a person will be charged with adult crimes.
The preliminary hearing is held in the
juvenile court. If the juvenile court judge
11

finds probable cause, the burden will shift
to the defendant to show that he or she
should remain in the juvenile court. And
unless the defendant fits some stringent
criteria, he or she will go directly to trial
as an adult in the district court. Juveniles
who do not meet the serious youth offender
criteria may still be tried as adults in
district court under the current
certification process. For consistency,
those cases will also have preliminary
hearings in the juvenile court. I am glad to
answer questions.
Mr. Speaker:

Representative Bresnahan.

Rep. Bresnahan;

Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
yield?

Rep. Fox:

Yes.

Rep. Bresnahan:

I have a question regarding the section
beginning on page 6 and 7 regarding a felony
committed by a juvenile age 14 or older. And
if you wouldn't mind, I'd like to understand
the difference between what was said earlier
in the bill about 16 and older and this
section regarding 14 and older.

Rep. Fox:

Under current law, the burden of proof is on
the State to show why they shouldn't. This
new change, it would shift that burden to the
defendant to prove why they should be judged
as a juvenile.

Rep. Bresnahan:

So, this--

Rep. Fox:

As an adult, I'm sorry.

Rep. Bresnahan:

This makes it easier for us to certify some
of these offenders as adults? Is that my
understanding? Is that correct?

Rep. Fox:

Yes.

Rep. Bresnahan:

That's the only question I have. I'd like to
say that I do support this bill very
heartily. It is needed. I have been, I've
taken the time to tour our juvenile
facilities. I've gone through every step of
the way that a juvenile could go through
those facilities at all the different levels.
12

Will the sponsor

And I've had opportunity not only to
interview the staff at those facilities but
many of the juveniles involved there as well
as some of their parents. It is quite clear
to me that we are dealing with a large
portion of the juvenile population who are
not only violent offenders but they are
repeat violent offenders.
And after having an opportunity to first-hand
see them and to gain some understanding of
their circumstances and the various things
that are happening in their lives, I think
the greatest service that we can do for them
is to intercede as early as possible in the
chain of events that lead them down a lifelong road of violence and constantly
requiring incarceration by our society.
Hopefully, by taking action early, by being
strong early and getting tough early, we're
going to prevent the continual repeat
offenses that seem to take place over and
over again, where we're hearing stories
almost daily of youths that have been through
this system time and time again, go back out
into society, and continue to cause greater
harm and greater injury to others, create
more crime. And not only do they do get
involved in it, but they're bringing others
along with them. I believe that the only way
that we're going to be able to see a decrease
is to get tougher, particularly on the youth
offenders, and I think this is an excellent,
excellent bill and it's worthy of all our
support. Thank you.
Mr. Speaker:

Representative Barth.

Rep. Barth:

Thank you, Mr. Speaker. Let me start off by
saying this is a good bill. There's a lot of
thought and energy that have gone into this
bill. This bill is a couple of things,
though. It's not a cure-all. Anybody who
thinks that this bill is going to take all of
these serious youth offenders off the streets
and we're going to be rid of that problem is
mistaken, but it goes a long ways in doing
that. It's not the last step in fixing a
system that is antiquated that we need to
take, but it is a significant and important
step. This is going to take some kids off
the street and put them into the adult system
13

faster than if we don't pass this bill. This
bill will get them off the streets two years
earlier.
We're talking about 16 year olds that are
going to get to the adult system eventually.
They're continuing their behavior. They've
had their one shot at the juvenile system.
They're going to get into the adult system.
We need to be mindful of a couple things,
though. The kid needs a one-stop good shot
at the juvenile system and the resources that
are there.
Some people have said the average stay for a
juvenile in the juvenile facility is eight
months. That's true. But you're lumping in
there children that have been in there for
years, putting that into the average, take
the top 10% out and the bottom 10% out; the
average stay is about three months. That's a
beds problem. This addresses a different
problem, and we need to address that beds
problem as well, and we are in this
Legislature to some degree.
We're not throwing kids away after this. The
kids have had a one-shot at the juvenile
system, and we need to start getting tough
with them. We need to let them know that
their behavior is unacceptable, and they need
to change if they're going to be allowed out
in society. I would urge you to vote for
this bill heartily, but do it mindfully that
this is not the last step in fixing the
juvenile justice problem that we've got in
the state of Utah. This is not going to
decrease gangs sufficiently that we can stop,
rest on our laurels and quit. But it is a
significant and worthwhile first step.
Johnson.

Mr. Speaker:

Representative M_

Rep. Johnson:

Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
question, please.

Mr. Speaker:

Previous question has been called. All in
favor of the previous question say "aye."

Body:

Aye.

Mr. Speaker:

Opposed "no."
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I move previous

Body:

(None)

Mr. Speaker:

The motion carries.
summation.

Rep. Fox:

I think it's all been said. I urge your
support. Please vote for the bill.
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